



The Characteristics of Transitional Justice
The concept of transitional justice arose to address the administration of justice in the special
context of regime change. In most understandings of the justice system, courts try people who are
accused of acts that were publicly crimes at the time they were committed. The Latin adage Nullum
crimen sine lege (‘there is no crime unless there is law’) is widely regarded a foundational to the
rule of law.1) Since the middle of the 20th century, however, the sanctity of this principle has been
challenged by cases in which individuals have been prosecuted for actions which were formally le­
gal under the authority of the recognized government of a sovereign state. War crimes and crimes
against humanity were extensively prosecuted in international military tribunals after the Second
World War2), and prosecutions for crimes against humanity have continued thereafter, albeit at ir­
regular intervals and in a variety of different tribunals, international, domestic and hybrid.
The actions for which defendants were prosecuted were deemed to be crimes either by virtue of
international customary law or by virtue of international treaty. The perpetrators, however, had car­
ried out these actions either at a time they were formally legal or in circumstances where they were
following the orders or expectations of legitimate authorities. Allowing international rules to prevail
over domestic law in this fashion was a major step in eroding what had once been the absolute sov­
ereignty of the state.3) Neil Kritz coined the term ‘transitional justice’ in 1995 to address the ques­
tion he posed as ‘how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes’, but the legal and moral
questions underlying transitional justice relate primarily to regime change, rather than specifically to
the transition to democracy.4)
Transitional justice, however, raised three issues that required further departure from the norms
of domestic legal systems. All three encouraged proponents of transitional justice to develop new
ways of imagining justice processes and outcomes First, most of the actions prosecuted in the name
of transitional justice had been carried out in the name of the state or under orders of state officials.
The legality of these acts at the time they were committed meant that the scope of legal culpability
was much greater than for most crimes, which have to be planned and carried out clandestinely and
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which therefore tend to involve only a small number of people. In transitional justice, by contrast,
guilt could encompass those who actually carried out a crime such as massacre or torture, those who
issued the immediate commands, and those who had created the broad circumstances in which the
crimes took place. To encompass this different aspects of criminal liability, the authorities who
prosecuted war crimes immediately after the Second World War developed a doctrine known as
command responsibility, which enabled them to reach far up the chain of command to people who
had not been physically present at the time that a crime was committed and who may not even have
known of the specific event. The post­war authorities also rejected the defence known as superior
orders (sometimes called the Nuremberg defence), under which the actual perpetrators claimed inno­
cence by virtue of following the commands of their superiors. This rejection was later made con­
crete in the doctrine of ‘joint criminal enterprise’, under which anyone who played a role in the
process leading to an atrocity could be considered culpable.5)
Second, transitional justice generally dealt with extraordinarily terrible crimes, generally catego­
rized as atrocities, because only such crimes were worth pursuing after the fall of an offending re­
gime. But atrocity generally defied easy punishment because of the scale of the crimes. Societies in
which a single murder might lead to life imprisonment struggled to determine what punishment
might be appropriate.
The third characteristic of transitional justice was that it was subject to what might be called
‘justice decay’, that is a diminished ability to achieve conventional justice. This decay arose partly
because both regime transition and the passage of time diminished the possibility of marshalling evi­
dence against the accused and achieving a verdict. Witnesses and accused were subject to human
mortality and senility ; documents went astray. Moreover, the standard motives for punishment―
vengeance, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation―always diminish in force with the passage of
time. Aging criminals cannot be kept in prison as long as young ones ; even execution robs them of
a smaller proportion of their lives. Delayed prosecution is a weaker deterrent than prompt convic­
tion. Old men do not need to be prevented from committing crimes, and are unlikely to have be­
come more amenable to rehabilitation.
These three distinctive characteristics of transitional justice have given the phenomenon special fea­
tures that separate it from conventional justice.
First, transitional justice often relaxes standards of proof. Conventional criminal law requires
that guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the recent experience of international tribunals has
shown that the financial cost of achieving a conviction is enormous. In around a quarter of a cen­
tury, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted 161 persons
and achieved eighty sentences at a total budget cost of around US$2 billion. During its first decade
of operation, the International Criminal Court delivered one verdict for a budget cost of US$900
million.6) These conviction figures are not so much a drop in the bucket as a tiny fleck of spray
from a Niagara Falls of human rights abuses. In consequence, transitional justice can achieve nu­
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merically significant results only by relaxing its standards of proof, moving from ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’ to the balance of probabilities and often to mere plausibility. The expedited procedures of
war crimes trials after the Second World War pioneered this approach, which has been taken to
greater lengths in other transitional justice for a such as Truth and reconciliation Commissions, the
gagaca courts of Rwanda7) and the various forms of international people’s tribunals.8)
Second, transitional justice affirms victims’ rights to a significantly greater extent than does
conventional criminal law. Whereas the emergence of criminal law has been interpreted as removing
the determination of guilt and the punishment of the guilty from the hands of victims (who might be
assumed to be biased and not to consider the overall interests of society), transitional justice typi­
cally shifts the balance back towards victims and their representatives. In particular, transitional jus­
tice tends to allow victims to determine whether justice has been done and permits the monetization
of victimhood by means of financial compensation.9)
Third, transitional justice responds to the problem of justice decay by positing what might be
called ‘extended historical responsibility’, in which guilt and victimhood persist beyond the deaths
of perpetrators and victims to influence the moral and legal standing of their heirs. The conse­
quences of past victimization can live on in the psychological and economic condition of descen­
dants,10) while today’s generations can be the undeserving beneficiaries of past atrocities.
Transitional justice emerged as a technique for dealing with the atrocities committed by oppres­
sive regimes which provided perpetrators with formal or practical legal protection. In dealing with
such crimes, the protagonists of transitional justice have ventured into legal and moral terrains that
had formerly been avoided by criminal law. The implications of this venture have yet to be fully ex­
plored.
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